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This paper argues that Pareto improvements based on
harmonizing tax reforms expressed in terms of the di-
vergence between actual and optimal tax structures
and over/under provision of public goods require the
use of ‘pseudo‐optimal’ taxes instead of optimal ones.
‘Pseudo‐optimal’ taxes are defined as those obtained
using the optimal tax formulas but evaluated at any
arbitrary initial tax structure. Within this context the
paper reconfirms existing results showing that tax
harmonization emerges as a strong policy instrument
in achieving a potential Pareto‐improvement.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Indirect tax harmonization has received considerable attention in the academic literature and
policy domain over the last two decades or so. Much of the literature has focused on the
desirability of reforms (when tax revenues are returned to the consumer in a lump‐sum fashion
or they are used to finance public goods), with the common theme emerging being that a
multilateral tax reform consisting of a move towards an appropriately weighted tax generates a
potential Pareto improvement (in the sense that at least one of the tax‐harmonizing countries
strictly gains and none lose). An actual Pareto improvement, where all participating countries
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strictly gain in welfare as a consequence of the harmonizing reform, is more difficult to be
achieved (Keen, 1987, 1989; Turunen‐Red & Woodland, 1990).1
The availability of instruments, relative to the number of margins, tax harmonization is
required to correct of course matters. The initial contributions dealing with the welfare effects
of tax harmonization assumed, somewhat unrealistically, that tax revenues are returned to the
representative consumer in each country in a lump‐sum fashion, thereby bypassing the welfare
implications of the reform if revenues were to be allocated through public good expenditure.
Intuition suggests that incorporating public good expenditure as an additional (and welfare)
margin requires the availability of an additional (to tax harmonization) instrument (see,
Delipalla, 1997; Karakosta et al., 2014; Keen et al., 2002; Kotsogiannis & Lopez‐Garcia, 2007;
Kotsogiannis et al., 2005; Lahiri & Raimondos‐Moller, 1998; Lockwood, 1997; Lopez‐
Garcia, 1996, 1998; Lucas, 2001; among others). The reason for this is that tax harmonization is
not sufficient, by way of design, to deal with two margins: one arising from inefficiencies in
either production or consumption2 and one arising from the intensity of preferences for public
goods.
The contribution of this paper is in recognizing that evaluating tax‐harmonizing reforms in
terms of divergence between actual and optimal tax structures (as in the early and insightful
contribution by Lahiri & Raimondos‐Moller, 1998) requires a more accurate definition of the
target taxes: These taxes will be conveniently called ‘pseudo‐optimal’ taxes and are obtained
using the optimal tax formulas evaluated at any arbitrary initial tax structure. This recognition,
inevitably, necessitates the analysis to revisit, and recast, the well‐known results in the con-
tribution of Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a standard general equilibrium model of
international trade where governments levy destination‐based taxes and provide public goods
whose supply benefits solely the resident of the country providing it.3 Section 3 reviews Lahiri
and Raimondos‐Moller (1998), who focus on Pareto‐improving tax‐harmonizing reforms that
are based on the divergence between actual and optimal taxes and over/under provision of
national public goods, and recasts these results by evaluating the reforms at particular tax
structures (those that utilize ‘pseudo‐optimal’ taxes). Section 4 briefly concludes.
2 | THE MODEL
The analysis is developed within a standard general equilibrium two‐country competitive trade
model where governments levy destination‐based taxes and revenue is used to provide a na-
tional public good that is, a public good whose supply benefits solely the resident of the country
providing it. The two countries are labeled ‘home’ and ‘foreign,’ and variables pertaining to the
1This welfare criterion is standard in the literature and reflects that in tax matters tax reforms typically require
unanimity. There are, of course, other forms of harmonization: one possibility is the harmonization of some policy
parameters (rate and base), whereas another one is when countries set tax policy parameters independently, and rely
primarily on exchange of information to resolve issues related to the taxation of intra‐community trade.
2And either, depending upon the tax system in place, tax principles: destination (commodities are taxed by, and
revenues accrue to, the country which consumption takes place) or origin (commodities are taxed by, and revenues
accrue to, the country that produces the goods).
3Kotsogiannis and Lopez‐Garcia (2021) discuss the case in which public goods are global in the sense that the
enjoyment of the good by the home (foreign) country resident does not diminish its availability for the citizen in the
foreign (home) country.
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home and foreign country are denoted by lower‐ and upper‐case letters, respectively. There is a
private sector in each country producing N + 1 tradeable commodities under constant returns
to scale, and a public sector which produces a nontradeable public good g (G). Destination‐
based taxes imply that commodities are taxed by the country where final consumption takes
place, this being the one receiving the ensuing tax revenues. Following Lahiri and Raimondos‐
Moller (1998), international producer prices are assumed to be constant and commodity taxes
(over the nonnuméraire good) are assumed to be uniform.
In the home (foreign) country there is a single representative consumer with preferences
described by an expenditure function e q g u( , , ) (E q G U( , , )) for the home (foreign) country,
where q (Q) is the N + 1‐vector of consumer prices of the private goods and u (U ) is the utility
of the consumer.4 The vector of compensated demands in the home (foreign) country is given
by eq (EQ),
5 and e− > 0g E(− > 0)G gives the marginal willingness to pay for g G( ) by the home
(foreign) consumer.
The private sector is competitive and characterized by a ‘restricted revenue function’ (or
‘restricted gross national product [GNP] function’) denoted by r p g( , ) (R p G( , )) for the home
(foreign) country. The vector of supplies in the home (foreign) country is given by rp (Rp), and
the scalar r < 0g (R < 0G ) gives the reduction in the home (foreign) country's production of
the tradeable goods—and so revenues r p g( , ) (R p G( , ))—as a consequence of an increase in the
production of the national public good. Public goods g and G are produced with technology
that exhibits constant returns to scale, implying that the marginal cost of production is given
by r− > 0g ( R− > 0G ).
6
Denoting the destination‐based commodity tax‐vector in the home country by t and in the
foreign one by T , the consumer price‐vector is given by q p t= + for the home country and
Q p T= + for the foreign one. The homogeneity properties of the above‐mentioned functions
in the variables q, Q, and p, imply that, without loss of generality, we can take the first
tradeable commodity, good 0, to be the numéraire and also to be the untaxed commodity in
both countries, so that p q Q= = = 10 0 0 . With uniform taxes over the nonnuméraire goods, we
can write t τ= 1 and T = 1, where τ and  are scalars and 1 is the N ‐column vector of 1's. We
can also notice in passing that with constant world producer prices, the assumption of constant
returns to scale entails that these prices can be normalized to be unity for all the N + 1
commodities. To do so, physical units have only to be ‘re‐scaled,’ so that if pi is the producer
price of a physical unit of commodity i, ∕p1 i units will have a price equal to one. With this
transformation, commodity taxation can be interpreted either as per unit or ad valorem
4For the home country, the expenditure function is the solution of ≡ ∣ ≥e q g u q x u x g u( , , ) min { ′ ˆ ( , ) }x , where x is the
consumption vector of the N + 1 private goods and ⋅û ( ) is the utility function.
5All vectors are column vectors, with a prime ( ′) indicating transposition. A subscript denotes differentiation.
6As discussed in Abe (1992), the ‘restricted revenue function’ embeds all the usual properties of technology. As far as
the private goods are concerned (and focusing on the home country), the standard GNP function is the solution of
≡ ∣ ∈r p v p y y F v*( , ) max { ′ ( )}p y
p , where y is the production vector of the N + 1 private goods, vp is the vector of the M
factors of production available in the private sector and F (·) is the private production possibility set. From well‐known
properties, r p v w* ( , ) =
v
p
p , where w is the factor price‐vector. With respect to public production, g is produced under
constant returns to scale by means of the vector of production factors vg . Full employment of the production factors v
(assumed to be internationally immobile) implies v v v+ =p g , which allows to write vp as a function v p g( , )p . The
restricted GNP function can then be found as r p g r p v p g( , ) = *[ , ( , )]p . Assuming that r* = 0v v M M×p p (and so factor prices
w are unaffected by the change in the factor endowments available for the private sectors, Abe, 1992, p. 213), it can be
shown that r p g r p v( , ) = *( , )p p p and that r p g− ( , )g equals the marginal cost of providing g. The implication of the latter
is that the marginal cost r− g is constant.
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taxation based on world producer prices. Focusing on the home country, consumer prices
become q τ τ= 1 + 1 = (1 + )1. On the other hand, ad valorem taxation at rate θ gives rise to
consumer prices q θ= (1 + )1 which amounts to the previous case when θ τ= .
For notational simplicity, p will continue to denote world producer prices, but the results
below can be interpreted both in terms of unit or ad valorem taxation. The framework also
allows for the existence of international transfers, denoted by z, from the foreign country to the
home one.7 The role of these transfers between governments will be to ensure that the welfare
of the foreign country is kept constant after any tax reform (and so characterize a potential
Pareto‐improvement).
An equilibrium for this economy is a set of values for the endogenous variables—utilities
u U, , and national public goods, g G, —that satisfy the budget constraints of the consumers and
governments, given the scalar tax rates, τ, , and the international transfer between govern-
ments, z. The system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium is given by8
e p τ g u r p g τ e p τ g u z( + 1, , ) = ( , ) + 1′ ( + 1, , ) + ,q (1)
  E p G U R p G E p G U z( + 1, , ) = ( , ) + 1′ ( + 1, , ) − ,Q (2)
τ e p τ g u z gr p g1′ ( + 1, , ) + = − ( , ),q g (3)
 E p G U z GR p G1′ ( + 1, , ) − = − ( , ).Q G (4)
Equation (1) gives the home country consumer's budget constraint: It simply states that, in
equilibrium, the minimum expenditure of the home consumer to achieve utility u is equal to
the sum of the income generated by the production of the tradeable goods, r p g( , ), and the
payment to factors employed in the public sector (which, in turn, are the revenues generated by
taxing own demand, given by τ e1′ q, and the international transfer z). A similar interpretation
applies to the budget constraint of the foreign consumer in Equation (2). Equations (3) and (4)
give the home and foreign country government budget constraints, respectively.
The analysis will now proceed by considering perturbations of the system (1)–(4), identi-
fying tax reforms dτ d dz{ , , } that generate a potential Pareto improvement of the form
du dU> 0, = 0. In doing so, it will be assumed that e E= = 0qu QU (where 0 is the N ‐column
vector of 0's) meaning that in each country income effects attach only to the untaxed numéraire
commodity, good 0.9 It will also be assumed that public good provision does not affect the
compensated demands for, and the supplies of, any good other than the numéraire, and so
e E r R= = = = 0qk Qk pk pk , k g G= , (0 being the N ‐column vector of 0's).
10
7z can be thought of as a transfer of the numéraire good, whose international price is 1. This good sold at the
international market will appear as additional income (and so expenditure) for the receiving country.
8As already noted, to model public good production the analysis follows Abe (1992). An alternative specification is to
assume, following Keen and Wildasin (2004), that the government purchases the numéraire good and (as, it will be
clear shortly below, it is assumed here) the public good use of this good does not affect the compensated demands for,
or the supplies of, the nonnuméraire goods. Adopting the present specification the analysis focuses both on the
spending side and public good production.
9This is a common assumption in the analysis of optimal commodity taxes and tax reforms. See, for example, Keen
(1989) and Keen and Wildasin (2004).
10Standard properties of the expenditure function ⋅e ( ) (and ⋅E ( )) imply that the N N( + 1) × ( + 1) matrix of sub-
stitution effects (including the untaxed numéraire good) is negative semidefinite. It will further be assumed that there
is enough substitutability between the numéraire good and all other goods so that the N N× matrices eqq and EQQ are
negative definite. See Dixit and Norman (1980) and Woodland (1982).
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3 | PARETO REFORMS AND ‘PSEUDO ‐OPTIMAL ’ TAXES
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where e > 0u (E > 0U ) is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income of the consumer
residing in the home (foreign) country. Notice that (5) and (6) characterize, for an arbitrary
value of the international transfer z, the optimal tax levels under the constraint that they are
uniform over the nonnuméraire commodities. These taxes, denoted by τ* for the home country
and  * for the foreign one, are given by



































where all the relevant variables11 are evaluated at their optimal values, denoted by an (*), given
a value of the transfer z. We turn to this shortly below.
Equation (6), for dU = 0, relates dz to d which when substituted into (5) gives the change
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A commonly studied reform12 takes the form of a uniform convergence of the type
 dτ β h τ d β h= ( − ), = ( − ), (9)
where β is a small positive number and h (a weighted average of the tax structures τ and  ) is
the target tax towards which the domestic tax structures converge, and given by
h kτ k= + (1 − ) . (10)
The choice of ∈k (0, 1) (see Lahiri & Raimondos‐Moller, 1998 and, in particular, Propositions
1–3 on pp. 263–264) captures the extent to which both countries over‐supply the national public
good, both undersupply it, and one of them under‐ and the other over‐supplies the public
good. ‘Over/under’‐supply is expressed in terms of τ ( ) being greater/less than τ*( *) in
Equation (7).
It is tempting to use optimal taxes τ* and  * in Equation (7) to express Equation (8) as13 the
change in utility in terms of divergences between actual and optimal taxes, τ τ( − *) and
 ( − *), that is,
11With the exception of rg and RG which, as noted earlier, are constants.
12And the one analyzed in Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998).
13As Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998) do on p. 260 and in eq. (13).




e du τ τ e dτ E d= ( − *)1′ 1 + ( − *)1′ 1 .
g
g
u dU qq QQ=0 (11)
But this would be problematic: The reason for this being that, as shown by (7), optimal taxes τ*
and  * embody compensated demands (e E*, *q Q), local demand responses (e E* , *qq QQ), and mar-
ginal valuations for the national public goods e E(− *, − *)g G , that are all evaluated at the optimal
configuration. However, their counterparts in Equation (8) are associated with arbitrary
(e E,q Q), (e E,qq QQ), and e E(− , − )g G .
It is worth elaborating more on the point made in the preceding paragraph. With fixed
international producer prices, the system of Equations (1)–(4) implies that optimal taxes can be
implicitly characterized as14
 τ ψ τ* = ( *), * = Ψ( *). (12)
The important point to emphasize here is that the functions ⋅ψ ( ) and ⋅Ψ( ) in (12) can be
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and they are obtained using optimal tax formulas but computed for any arbitrary tax structure.
Although optimal taxes and ‘pseudo‐optimal’ taxes have the same functional form, the com-
pensated demands, local demand responses and marginal valuations for the public goods in (7)
and (13) will in general be different. This is, arguably, a subtle but important point.





e du τ ψ τ e dτ E d= [ − ( )]1′ 1 + [ − Ψ( )]1′ 1 .
g
g
u dU qq QQ=0 (14)
From a policy perspective the question then is: Do the tax‐harmonizing reforms analyzed in
Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998) still deliver a potential Pareto improvement? The answer
to this is in the affirmative if, starting from (14), an appropriate interpretation of the reforms in
(9) and (10) is adopted as follows: First, optimal taxes τ* and T* are replaced with ‘pseudo‐
optimal’ ones, ψ τ( ) and Ψ( ) and, second, over‐ or under‐supply of public goods (i.e., τ T( )
being greater or less than τ T*( *)) are reformulated in terms of pre‐existing taxes, τ T( ), being
greater or less than ‘pseudo‐optimal’ ones ψ τ( )(Ψ( )).
As one would expect, local demand responses will be taken into account in the choice of the
weights k in (10). But, importantly, the precise value of k will also depend on the sign of the
divergence τ ψ τ[ − ( )] and  [ − Ψ( )]. Applying this reasoning to the three cases considered in
Propositions 1–3 in Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998) requires that Proposition 1 (p. 263) is
restated in terms of τ and  being greater than ψ τ( ) and Ψ( ), respectively, and k takes the
value of
14To see this consider the home country. For this country, and for given z , Equations (1) and (3) implicitly determine
τ τ g u z= ( , , ) and g g τ u z= ( , , ). Substituting the latter into the former gives ≡τ τ g τ u z u z τ u z= [ ( , , ), , ] φ( , , ), which,
again for fixed z , is a function relating u to τ . It then follows that dτ dτ du= φ + φτ u . Thus, the expression
∕ ∕du dτ = (1 − φ ) φ = 0τ u characterizes the optimal τ and so τ ψ τ* = ( *) in Equation (7) (or 12). Similar considerations
apply to Equations (2) and (4) for the foreign country.











where ∕ω ψ τ τ= 1 − ( ) and  ∕TΩ = 1 − Ψ( ) . By the same token, in Proposition 2, where













where ∕σ τ ψ τ= ( − ( ) and   ∕τΣ = − Ψ( ) . And, finally, in the counterpart of Proposition 3,











Summarizing the above discussion:
Proposition 1. When governments provide public goods, with fixed international
producer prices and uniform (per unit or ad valorem) commodity taxes, the tax‐
harmonizing reforms (9) and (10) deliver a potential Pareto improvement (in the sense that
du dU> 0 ( = 0) in Equation 14), when ‘pseudo‐optimal’ taxes, ψ τ( ) and Ψ( ) are used,
and over‐ or under‐supply of public goods is appropriately reformulated in terms of pre‐
existing taxes, τ and  , being greater or less than those ‘pseudo‐optimal’ ones.
4 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has discussed the existence of global welfare gains as a consequence of the im-
plementation of multilateral harmonizing reforms of the indirect tax structures of two countries
in the presence of public goods provision. The framework has been a standard general equi-
librium model of international trade where governments levy destination‐based taxes whose
revenue is used to provide a public good whose supply benefits solely the resident of the
country providing it. A subtle, but important, contribution of the paper is in introducing
‘pseudo‐optimal taxes’ into the discussion of tax harmonization. These taxes are those obtained
using the optimal tax formulas but evaluated at any arbitrary initial tax structure. Within this
context, it has been shown that the results developed in Lahiri and Raimondos‐Moller (1998)
need to be appropriately recast using the above‐mentioned ‘pseudo‐optimal taxes.’ Importantly,
though, the paper has reconfirmed that tax harmonization does emerge as an important policy
instrument in achieving a potential Pareto‐improvement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This study was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/S00713X/1,
Kotsogiannis) and the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (RTI2018‐
095799‐B‐I00, Lopez‐Garcia). The usual caveat applies.
ORCID
Miguel‐Angel Lopez‐Garcia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5012-1869
KOTSOGIANNIS AND LOPEZ‐GARCIA | 7
REFERENCES
Abe, K. (1992). Tariff reform in a small open economy with public production. International Economic Review,
30, 209–222.
Delipalla, S. (1997). Commodity tax harmonization and public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 63, 447–466.
Dixit, A. K., & Norman, V. (1980). Theory of international trade. Cambridge University Press.
Karakosta, O., Kotsogiannis, C., & Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (2014). Indirect tax harmonization and global public
goods. International Tax and Public Finance, 21(1), 29–49.
Keen, M. J. (1987). Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonization. Journal of Public Economics, 33, 107–114.
Keen, M. J. (1989). Pareto‐improving indirect tax harmonization. European Economic Review, 33, 1–12.
Keen, M. J., Lahiri, S., & Raimondos‐Møller, P. (2002). Tax principles and tax harmonization under imperfect
competition: A cautionary example. European Economic Review, 46, 1559–1568.
Keen, M. J., & Wildasin, D. (2004). Pareto‐efficient international taxation. American Economic Review, 94,
259–275.
Kotsogiannis, C., & Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (2007). Imperfect competition, indirect tax harmonization and public
goods. International Tax and Public Finance, 14(2), 135–149.
Kotsogiannis, C., & Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (2021). Commodity tax harmonization and public goods
provision (Discussion Paper 029–20). Tax Administration Research Center, University of Exeter Business
School.
Kotsogiannis, C., Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A., & Myles, G. (2005). The origin principle, tax harmonization and public
goods. Economics Letters, 87(2), 211–219.
Lahiri, S., & Raimondos‐Møller, P. (1998). Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax
harmonisation. Journal of Public Economics, 67, 253–267.
Lockwood, B. (1997). Can commodity tax harmonisation be Pareto‐improving when governments supply public
goods? Journal of International Economics, 43, 387–408.
Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (1996). The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization.
International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 83–93.
Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (1998). On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization. Economics Letters, 60,
185–193.
Lucas, V. (2001). Tax harmonisation and the origin principle. Economics Letters, 71, 111–115.
Turunen‐Red, A. H., & Woodland, A. D. (1990). Multilateral reforms of domestic taxes. Oxford Economic Papers,
42, 160–186.
Woodland, A. D. (1982). International trade and resource allocation. North‐Holland.
How to cite this article: Kotsogiannis, C., & Lopez‐Garcia, M.‐A. (2021). On
commodity tax harmonization and public goods provision. Journal of Public Economic
Theory, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12535
8 | KOTSOGIANNIS AND LOPEZ‐GARCIA
